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Evaluating the Economic Impact of Countervailing Duties on United States Warm Water 
Shrimp Imports  
 
Abstract 
Estimates of price and scale elasticities for U.S. consumed shrimp are derived using aggregate 
source country shrimp import data.  It was assumed that supply was perfectly elastic and U.S. 
wholesalers determine the quantities imported from individual countries given the prices and 
preferences of U.S. consumers.  Ex-ante analysis suggests that most countries levied with the 
countervailing duty experience declines in U.S. import demand while those countries not 
affected by the countervailing duty experience increases in import demand.  Ex-post analysis 
shows the reverse to be true.  Several countries impacted by the countervailing duty had 
increased import demand from the United States while Mexico, which was not affected by the 
countervailing duty, had decreased import demand.  The results from aggregate level data 
suggest that imposing duties on specific companies within a country may not be effective if that 
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Six of the world’s major shrimp exporting countries supplied more that 70 percent of the over 
1.1 billion pounds of shrimp imported into the United States in 2004: Brazil, Ecuador, India, 
Thailand, Vietnam and China.  (see figure 1).  Responding to large increases in the amount of 
shrimp imported into the United States and to falling prices for shrimp products beginning in 
2000 (see figure 2), several groups representing the U.S. shrimp fishing industry filed petitions 
asking the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) and the U.S. Department of 
Commerce (USDOC) to investigate whether these imports were being sold into the United States 
below fair value or were receiving subsidies from foreign government programs.  The 
investigations resulted in the imposition of a countervailing duty in 2005 on importation of 
certain warm water shrimp products from the six countries.    
 
A countervailing duty is a duty imposed on selected U.S. imports deemed by the USDOC as 
benefiting from subsidies generated by a foreign government or by a firm or person in that 
country (USITC 1993).  Based on the USITC’s determination that the imports in question are 
injurious to, or threaten to injure the U.S. industry, the Secretary of Commerce issues a 
countervailing duty, which is enforced by the U.S. Customs Service.  The countervailing duty 
does not necessarily impose one countervailing duty on all U.S. imports.  Instead, different 
exporting companies may be determined by USDOC as benefiting from different levels of 
subsidies, causing U.S. imports from different foreign companies to be assigned different 
countervailing duties.  The investigations resulted in a set of antidumping margins for shrimp 
exporting companies within the six aforementioned countries.  The antidumping margins run   2
from zero to a high of 112.8 percent and the duties vary by company within each country (Table 
1). The other major U.S. shrimp suppliers not covered by the antidumping duties are Mexico, 
Bangladesh and Indonesia. 
 
The products included in the countervailing duties include certain warm-water shrimp and 
prawns, whether frozen, wild caught (ocean harvested) or farm-raised (produced by aquaculture), 
head-on or head off, shell-on or peeled, tail-on or tail-off, de-veined, cooked or raw, or otherwise 
processed in frozen form.   The frozen warm-water shrimp and prawn products included in the 
scope of the countervails, regardless of definitions in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the 
United States (HTSUS), are products which are processed from warm-water shrimp, frozen and 
sold in any count size (Fact sheet – International Trade Administration (ITA), Department of 
Commerce. 
 
Dumping refers to certain pricing practices of firms engaging in international commerce (Kerr, 
2001).  The World Trade Organization (WTO) considers a product to be dumped if it is 
introduced into the commerce of another country at less than its normal value; if the export price 
of the product exported from one country to another is less than the comparable price, in the 
ordinary course of trade, for like products destined for in the exporters home market. 
 
This study examines the U.S. total shrimp demand and U.S. elasticities of demand for shrimp 
differentiated by source country of production.  Specifically, the paper aims to: (1) empirically 
estimate the total U.S. demand for shrimp and the conditional import demand for shrimp 
consumed in the U.S. with an econometric model; (2) to calculate short-run and long-run 
conditional import demand elasticities from estimated demand parameters; and (3) to determine   3
the impact of the countervailing duties imposed in 2005 on U.S. import demand.  The next 
section of the paper provides the model specification for empirical analysis.  Section 3 describes 
the data used for analysis.  Section 4 provides the results and empirical discussion and the last 
section provides our conclusions.  
 
Model Specification 
In this paper, the Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) demand system derived by 
Keller and Van Driel (1985) is used to estimate shrimp demand parameters.  The CBS model 
combines the non-linear expenditure effects of the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) 
(Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980b)) and the price effect of the Rotterdam model (Theil, (1966) and 
Barton, (1969)).  The Rotterdam model meets negativity conditions on the Slutsky matrix 
required for a downward sloping demand curve if its price coefficients are negative, semi-
definite.  The CBS is a set of partial differential equations.  Differential demand systems are 
commonly estimated under the assumption that differences, usually first differences, are good 
approximations of the differential demand.  Consider the general CBS model: 
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In (1) and (2) above,  i q  is the quantity of shrimp imported from country “i,”  p  is the price of 
shrimp in country “j,” andx the total expenditure on all goods.  The terms n, . n , ij Lq Lp ∂∂ and   4
n i Lx ∂  are the partial derivatives of the logarithms of the quantity, price, and expenditures, and 
ij c  and  j b  are coefficients.  The  i w  is the budget share for shrimp from the i
th country. 
 
Consistency with utility maximization requires that the coefficients satisfy the following 
restrictions: 








ij a b c c , 0  implying homogeneity of degree zero and the adding-up 
condition holds for the budget constraint, and 
(4)  ij c c ji ij ∀ = , , implying symmetry 
Further, the matrix formed by the  ij c ’s has to be negative, semi-definite, a restriction that 
implies, among other things, that the compensated demand curve slopes downward.  It is not 
usually imposed when estimating the CBS or related demand systems models and was not 
imposed in this model. 
 
The study does not take into consideration the range of supply issues that may impact on a 
source country’s ability to export shrimp.  Instead, the assumption was that supply was perfectly 
elastic and U.S. wholesalers determine the quantities imported from individual countries given 
the prices and preferences of U.S. consumers.  Wholesale level data was used for the analysis 
and unit values were used for imported shrimp price.  Ideally, retail level prices and quantities 
would be more appropriate to gauge consumer response but time series data at the retail level is 
unavailable for shrimp. 
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The U.S. shrimp demand model rests on the assumption of a two-stage budgeting process, where 
the aggregate quantity of shrimp consumed by the U.S. is determined in the first stage, and the 
second stage focuses on the demands for shrimp by country of origin.  The two-stage budgeting 
approach is outlined in Kesvan, et al., (1993).  
 
In the first stage the aggregate demand for U.S. shrimp is expressed as a function of a mixed 
weighted shrimp price based on all the source countries,  the prices of substitutes (the price index 
for whole chicken,  the 12-City wholesale price), and aggregate expenditure on all food.  This 
procedure yields a differential total U.S. demand for shrimp represented by the mixed quantity 
Divisia index. 
 
In the second stage, the demand for shrimp, both domestic and imported is specified as a 
function of prices and the mixed quantity Divisia index from the first stage.  Separability is 
assumed in the demand for shrimp from each country.  See Deaton and Muellbauer (1980b) and 
Moschini et al. for good expositions of the validity of the separability assumption in demand 
systems.  The mixed quantity index, which was endogenous in the first stage, is exogenous in the 
second stage, thus capturing the expenditure effects with regards to the country-specific import 
demands. 
 
A dynamic approach is applied to the general CBS model to capture both the short-run and long-
run relations in the two stages of shrimp demand.  In the first stage a differential total demand 
equation is specified:   6
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dBQ = the mixed quantity Divisia index (shrimp consumption) 
dBP  = the mixed price Divisia index (shrimp price) 
dCPI  = the consumer price index for chicken 
dEX  = personal consumption expenditure 
dSP = the weighted wholesale price of chicken (substitute) 
1, ( 1,....,7), , ii j i m i and α βδ γ =  are parameters to be estimated and  it ν  is the disturbance term.  
The CBS model used in the second stage allows for the estimation of source country shrimp 
demand without imposing restrictive a priori assumptions with regard to expenditure effects 
(Deaton and Muellbauer 1980a). 
(6) 
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where it w  is the expenditure share of shrimp consumed from the 
th i source country,  j p  is the 
differential price based on the unit value of imports and the domestic wholesale price, and a, cij, 
dij, b1, and b2 are parameters to be estimated and eij is the disturbance term.  The source countries 
included in the model are Mexico, Ecuador, India, Thailand, Vietnam, China, the United States, 
and the rest of the world.  The United States equation was omitted to avoid singularity in 
estimation of the empirical model. 
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Own-price, cross-price, and expenditure elasticities, η are calculated for each country-specific 
import demand. 
(7)  i
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η + =1      Expenditure  elasticity 
The impact of the countervailing duty, D on imports from each country, Σ was calculated as 
(9)
 
* iy η Ω= Ψ
 




The data consist of U.S shrimp production and prices and U.S. shrimp import data from 8 
importing countries for 16 10-digit HS codes.  Six of these countries had antidumping duties 
imposed. Mexico and the Rest of the World (ROW) had no antidumping duties applied.  Brazil, 
though one of the countries levied with antidumping duties, was included with the rest of the 
world for two reasons. First, there were no reported imports from Brazil for several months 
during the study period. Second, its share of imports by the U.S. was very small for the reported 
months.   Though the countervailing duties varied among companies within the affected 
countries, data were not available for each company’s imports.  As such, import data for each of 
the HS codes was aggregated to a monthly total for each country and analysis of the 
countervailing duty impact was based on the country-wide rate of duty, rather than by company.  
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Monthly import quantities and expenditures from each country were obtained from the U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service, Foreign Agricultural Trade Statistics.  
All expenditures are on a free on board (FOB) basis, meaning that transportation costs, insurance 
and custom duties are not included.  This makes the import price fairly representative of the 
wholesale U.S. domestic price.  Using expenditures and quantities, per-unit values ($/lb) for each 
country were calculated and multiplied by that country’s nominal exchange rate.  A relative price 
index series for each country was then calculated as the ratio of the U.S. shrimp price to the 
imported price.  
 
The demand analysis is done at the wholesale level.  A summary of the descriptive statistics is 
presented in tables 2 and 3. It was expected that countries not subject to countervailing duty 
would become more competitive and increase their market shares of shrimp to the United States.  
However, the mean imports from all the countries affected by the countervailing duties increased 
during 2005, while imports from Mexico decreased. Also, the mean unit value in 2005 was lower 
for all countries, except India and Mexico.  
 
Empirical Results and Discussion 
A separate demand system is estimated for the total shrimp consumed and the shrimp import 
demand based on country of origin.  The 3SLS procedure in SAS was used to estimate both the 
first stage and the second stage equations as a system.  The U.S. equation was omitted in the 
second stage due to adding up restrictions. Following Anderson and Blundell (1983), Kesvan et 
al., (1993), and Hahn, (2001) symmetry and homogeneity restrictions were imposed on the 
lagged variables. 
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Estimated conditional price and share demand elasticities (the share demand elasticity could be 
referred to as a scale elasticity) calculated from the estimated parameters are reported in table 4.  
The conditional own-price elasticities represent both the substitution and the income effect of 
price changes.  The conditional elasticities are averaged over the monthly values for the years 
1995 to 2004, the entire sample period.  The own-price elasticities for both the short-run and the 
long-run were negative, as expected, for most of the countries but were surprisingly positive for 
Mexico, Vietnam, and China.  Own-price elasticities were less than one for all countries, except 
the United States, implying that it is possible for these countries to increase revenue by lowering 
quantities supplied. 
 
The results suggest significantly different effects from price changes on U.S. shrimp demand 
from the different countries. India had the least inelastic demand.  If the price of Indian shrimp 
increases by 1-percent, the quantity of Indian shrimp demanded will decrease by 0.044 percent, 
in the short-run, and 0.149 percent in the long-run.  Own-price changes have a greater effect on 
Thailand’s shrimp import demand.  A 1-percent increase in Thai shrimp prices would decrease 
the import quantity demanded by the U.S. by about 0.406 percent in the short-run and 0.995 
percent in the long-run.  U.S. shrimp had an elastic demand, implying that an increase in U.S. 
shrimp price may mean a greater than proportionate decrease in the quantity of U.S shrimp 
demanded.  A 1-percent increase in the U.S. shrimp price would decrease the quantity demanded 
by the United States for U.S. shrimp by about 1.274 percent in the short-run and 3.086 percent in 
the long-run.  
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The conditional scale elasticity measures the degree by which the amount of shrimp demanded 
from the U.S. and importing countries change when U.S. overall shrimp demand changes.  
Embodied in the scale elasticity is the expenditure effect, which captures the amount that the 
shrimp quantity demanded changes when U.S. shrimp expenditure changes.  The conditional 
scale elasticities in table 5 are calculated based on the average total demand share for shrimp 
from January 1995 to December, 2004.  In the short-run, scale elasticities for all countries were 
positive, with Mexico, Vietnam, China and the United States being greater than one. Ecuador, 
ROW, India and Thailand had scale elasticities of less than 1, though positive. 
 
These results indicate that, in the short-run, if overall U.S. shrimp demand increases by 1 
percent, the quantity of shrimp demanded from Mexico, Vietnam, China, and the United would 
more than proportionately increase, while the quantity demanded from Ecuador, ROW, India, 
and Thailand would less than proportionately increase.  However, in the long run, if overall U.S. 
shrimp demand increases, the quantity demanded from Ecuador and the ROW would decrease.  
 
Table 5 presents the calculated effect of the countervailing duty on the demand from different 
countries. The analysis for the impact of the countervailing duty was done a priori the imposition 
of the duty since it is based on data from 1995-2004.  It is expected that the countervailing duty 
would increase the price of imported product from the impacted countries, making it less 
desirable to U.S. importers.  The aim of U.S. shrimp producers is to increase overall U.S. shrimp 
prices and also increase their share of the U.S. market.  The results show, as expected, that 
Ecuador, India, Thailand and China would all experience declines in import demand from the 
United States with India expected to experience the greatest loss in import demand, followed by   11
Ecuador.  As expected, Mexico and the ROW (with no duty) would experience an increase in 
import demand from the United States.  Surprisingly, Vietnam would experience an increase in 
import demand even with a rather high countervailing duty.  Also surprising is that the U.S. 
would see a decrease in its domestically produced shrimp demand due to the imposed duty.  
 
Table 6 presents pairwise comparisons of 2004 and 2005 shrimp quantities and prices.  Since the 
countervailing duty was imposed in 2005, it is expected that prices for shrimp from countries 
with the duty would increase, thus causing the quantity of shrimp imported from those countries 
to be reduced while shrimp imports from countries not affected by the duty would increase.  The 
results show that only imports from China saw a significant reduction in the quantity of shrimp 
imported.  This is expected since the countervailing duty imposed on China would more than 
double the price of its imported shrimp.  Contrary to expectations, the mean monthly price of 
shrimp from China was significantly lower in 2005 than in 2004.  Despite the countervailing 
duty, Ecuador and Thailand also had significantly lower prices in 2005 and the quantities 
imported from both countries in 2005 were significantly higher than in 2004.  Shrimp imported 
from China, Thailand and Ecuador had among the lowest unit-price of all the importing counties. 
 
Conclusions 
Based on the results from this study, the countervailing duties imposed by the U.S. on six major 
shrimp exporting countries did not have the intended effect on U.S shrimp imports.  It was 
expected that countries not covered by the countervailing duties would become more competitive 
and increase their market shares of all shrimp exported to the United States.  However, the 
market shares for non-affected countries declined during 2005, while most of the affected   12
countries experienced an increase in U.S. market share.  Also, all the countries affected by the 
countervailing duty had reductions in their average import prices with statistically significant 
price reductions seen in China, Thailand and Ecuador.  
 
Since the countervailing duties varied by companies within the country, it is likely that 
companies within the country that were less affected by the duty may have become more 
involved in exporting to the United States, while exports from more affected companies were 
diverted to other markets.  This suggest that imposing countervailing duties on specific 
companies within a country may not be effective if that company is not a monopoly producer or 
controls a significant share of the shrimp produced in that country. 
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Figure 1. U.S. Shrimp Imports from Mexico, Ecuador, Brazil, India, Thailand, Vietman, 
























Source: U.S. Department of Commerce. U.S. Bureau of Census. Foreign Trade Statistics.   14





















Source: U.S. Department of Commerce. U.S. Bureau of Census. Foreign Trade Statistics.  15
Table 1.  Antidumping Duties for Certain Frozen Warm Water Shrimp Products 
 
Countries   Highest company    Lowest company    Margins for All   
   Margin    Margin    Companies  
       Without specific  
          Margins  
      
People's Republic of China   82.27 %    0.07 %    112.81 %  
      
      
Vietnam   25.76 %    4.30 %    25.76 %  
      
      
Brazil   67.80 %    4.97 %    7.05 %  
      
      
Ecuador   4.42 %    1.97 %    3.58 %  
      
      
India   15.36 %    2.48 %    10.17 %  
      
      
Thailand  6.82 %  5.29 %  5.95 % 
      
           
      
Source: International Trade Administration (ITA),  U.S. Department of Commerce.   16
Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics on U.S. Consumption of Shrimp by Source Country, January 
1995 to December 2004. 
 
 Mean  Median  Minimum  Maximum  Coefficient 
of Variation
Mexico 
   Quantity (1000 lbs)  5625.60 3757.45 102.35 21889.02 72.62
    Price ($ per lb)  5.28 5.07 3.47 8.39 0.89
    Value (000 USD)  29281.70 18507.95 719.36 128496.90 166.69
 
Ecuador 
    Quantity (1000 lbs)  7746.13 7295.02 2325.66 15317.67 58.85
    Price ($ per lb)  3.62 3.76 2.42 5.06 0.79
    Value (000 USD)  28408.95 25562.78 9656.13 65290.89 121.89
 
Rest of the World   
   Quantity (1000 lbs)  19918.75 19091.97 9901.51 40769.04 83.32
    Price ($ per lb)  3.71 3.74 2.38 4.90 0.76
    Value (000 USD)  72270.86 67987.85 38310.74 142453.38 151.44
 
India 
   Quantity (1000 lbs)  5301.71 4566.01 1898.09 14704.80 51.20
    Price ($ per lb)  3.40 3.43 1.97 5.02 0.80
    Value (000 USD)  18845.51 15051.21 5239.31 55198.60 107.59
 
Thailand 
    Quantity (1000 lbs)  19702.97 17127.44 6895.14 51077.52 91.85
    Price ($ per lb)  4.69 4.85 2.61 6.32 1.00
    Value (000 USD)  88875.41 82859.08 21947.11 187709.96 183.64
 
Vietnam 
     Quantity (1000 lbs)  3824.06 1809.88 41.19 15544.94 64.41
     Price ($ per lb)  5.65 5.46 2.66 8.84 1.04
     Value (000 USD)  19612.53 11321.23 233.83 73955.82 139.39
 
China 
     Quantity (1000 lbs)  5349.73 2719.33 224.70 25336.39 79.82
     Price ($ per lb)  2.46 2.37 1.48 4.50 0.72
     Value (000 USD)  13599.92 7355.85 401.91 64532.35 126.51
 
United States 
      Quantity (1000 lbs)  28781.63 30417.46 3159.51 89502.92 129.78
       Price ($ per lb)  1.78 1.81 0.87 2.78 0.64
       Value (000 USD)  48542.91 51486.84 6900.40 202629.90 170.37
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Table 3.  Descriptive Statistics on U.S. Consumption of Shrimp by Source Country, January- 
December  2005 
 
 Mean  Median  Minimum Maximum  Coefficient  of 
Variation
Mexico  
   Quantity (1000 lbs)  5161.58 3441.97 178.70 18009.52  78.63
    Price ($ per lb)  5.16 5.24 4.13 5.82  0.69
    Value (000 USD)  26904.24 19208.43 854.54 89441.20  177.19
Ecuador  
   Quantity (1000 lbs)  9102.35 8780.15 6287.88 12755.55  44.12
    Price ($ per lb)  2.51 2.52 2.32 2.61  0.28
    Value (000 USD)  22813.61 22151.87 16388.05 29566.95  66.98
Rest of the World   
   Quantity (1000 lbs)  30727.34 30720.05 23501.93 38308.12  71.62
    Price ($ per lb)  2.99 3.02 2.73 3.12  0.34
    Value (000 USD)  91939.01 92023.38 67128.21 117498.74  128.78
India  
   Quantity (1000 lbs)  6500.59 6099.62 2664.17 12662.62  52.09
    Price ($ per lb)  3.96 3.93 3.79 4.40  0.40
    Value (000 USD)  25681.41 23686.28 10504.83 48727.97  102.35
Thailand  
   Quantity (1000 lbs)  29535.92 30614.57 16792.06 45252.10  97.93
    Price ($ per lb)  2.78 2.78 2.58 3.03  0.37
    Value (000 USD)  82040.04 84755.67 45684.77 120304.08  162.18
Vietnam  
   Quantity (1000 lbs)  7888.45 7979.04 2623.36 12589.99  60.44
    Price ($ per lb)  4.77 4.74 4.41 5.26  0.51
    Value (000 USD)  36936.54 38247.28 13798.63 59673.50  126.29
China  
   Quantity (1000 lbs)  8239.83 8240.29 2681.26 14149.39  59.29
    Price ($ per lb)  2.02 2.03 1.80 2.29  0.38
    Value (000 USD)  16940.46 17263.75 5334.46 32470.06  90.43
 Table 4.  Estimated conditional price and scale elasticities for the CBS model, 1995-2004, Monthly 
 






























Mexico   0.161  -2.406 1.063 -0.856 0.208 -0.018 0.485 0.211 2.105
Ecuador -0.073  -0.333 -0.042 -0.085 -0.473 -0.154 -0.165 0.052 0.381
Rest of the 
World 
-0.272 0.564 -0.399 0.331 0.121 -0.113 -0.107 -0.193 0.417
India -0.398  0.490 -0.066 -0.044 -0.853 -0.516 -0.094 0.355 0.724
Thailand 0.076  -0.104 -0.575 -0.070 -0.406 -0.011 -0.039 0.195 0.968
Vietnam -0.508  -1.353 0.234 -0.270 -0.922 0.251 0.124 -0.194 1.185
China -0.621  -0.045 0.834 -0.422 -1.561 0.090 0.057 -0.064 1.119







1.177 -6.227 3.656 -1.954 2.595 0.236 1.206 1.325 3.750
Ecuador 0.004  -0.797 0.120 -0.319 -0.627 0.073 -0.331 0.414 -0.815
Rest of the 
World 
-0.590 1.446 -0.750 0.895 0.425 -0.114 -0.155 -0.305 -0.306
India -0.862  0.428 0.449 0.149 -1.533 -1.326 -0.200 0.983 0.326
Thailand 0.380  -0.520 -1.380 -0.154 -0.995 0.022 -0.112 0.595 1.221
Vietnam -1.192  -2.013 1.121 -0.474 -2.522 0.796 0.094 -0.383 1.483
China -1.560  -0.654 2.661 -1.342 -2.888 0.039 0.424 0.512 1.834





 Table 5. Estimated Change in Demand after Imposition of Countervailing Duties 
 
Country  Percent Change in 
Demand 
Mexico   0.651
Ecuador -0.346
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Table 6. Paired Comparisons of 2004 and 2005 shrimp quantities and prices 
 
    Mean  Paired T-Test (df=11) 
Quantity    2004 2005 T-Value  Pr > |t| 
Mexico   5,328.1 5,161.6 0.42 0.686
Ecuador   6,881.7 9,102.3 -3.55* 0.005
Rest of the World  32,317.5 30,727.3 1.24 0.242
India   7,506.5 6,500.6 0.91 0.383
Thailand   24,295.8 29,535.9 -1.11 0.291
Vietnam   6,794.2 7,888.4 -0.88 0.395
China   11,990.0 8,239.8 1.85* 0.091
Price      
Mexico   5.02 5.16 -1.26 0.235
Ecuador   2.58 2.51 2.85* 0.016
Rest of the World  3.02 2.99 0.34 0.738
India   3.98 3.96 0.17 0.867
Thailand   3.05 2.78 2.48* 0.030
Vietnam   4.79 4.77 0.16 0.875
China   2.28 2.02 4.62* 0.001
* Significant at the 10-percent level.  21
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